ports of sales and goods on hand, insisted upon prompt remittances,-and, shortly became a dead letter. Possibly we would say today that it was "unconstitutional," as attempting to hold too close a rein on private initiative.'5 At all events the factor was able to circumvent it; first by dealings with the poorer merchants, promising them prompt sales and, in the case of sales on credit, by himself guaranteeing the account, for a commission.16 But, at least, the unduly acquisitive spirit may have been somewhat chastened.
The factor's next important brush with the authorities, only 50 odd years later, did not involve textiles at all, but logwood brought to England by ship. The forum was different, being that of the Chancery Court, Lord Hardwicke presiding, and "the great Question in the cause was, Supposing Mico [the factor] had a lien on these goods and produce, so as to be entitled to retain them for the balance of the account; whether he has not parted with that right?" The case being in bankruptcy the court was inclined "to equality," but desired the opinion of four merchants in court as witnesses "upon the custom and usage" relating to such matters. Here, obviously, was a sympathetic hearing to learn the needs of business. The merchants were very clear, that, where there was a general account between factor and principal, the factor might retain both ship and cargo not only for particular charges but for any balance due on the general account. But in this case the factor had turned over the goods to his principal's broker and in such event "it is safer for trade" to deny the lien. "It is better to allow that which is the public notorious transaction, than that which is secret." Though Mico lost his case, the factor's general lien, based on possession, had been established, which was no small gain. 17 It is instructive to note how easily and with what little publicity this bit of law was made. It is only fair to say, of course, that English commerce had expanded greatly in the preceding half century and that a decision denying the factor a general lien-particularly as respects logwood shipped in from out of country-might have caused much greater notoriety. As might be expected Lord Mansfield was quick to approve. Within three years, in 1758, he wrote: "I take it to be now a settled [sic] point, that a factor to whom a balance is due, has a lien upon all goods of his principal, so long as they remain in his possession. '18 And by 1775, not only had the textile factor taken over the "5A number of recent cases could be cited. 16 For an excellent discussion of the whole manoeuvre see WESTERFIELD, MID-DLEMEN IN ENGLISH BUSINESS (1915) 296 et seq.
lien for his own uses, but it was extended for him to include "a lien on the price of goods in the hands of the buyer"'19 as well. Though the factor "had not the actual possession" of the goods, "yet as he had a power of giving a discharge, or bringing an action, he had a right to retain the money"20 paid to him by the buyer, in spite of notice not to do so from the clothier's assignees.
The frank-or at best thinly disguised-partnership between the law courts and the commercial classes at this time evolved a highly dynamic philosophy. In the words of Buller, J., "quick circulation, is the life and soul of trade,"'21 and that trade should be promoted, even though at considerable strain to accepted legal doctrine, these judges never doubted. Why was the factor given a general lien? For the very good reason, according to Chambre, J., that his being given one would "encourage factors to advance money upon goods in their possession, or which must come into their hands as factors," a result necessary "for the convenience of trade."22 Nothing could be more explicit. It is not suggested that this conclusion be criticized, but rather that it be lauded, for a whole colonial empire lay at hand awaiting "development. Possibly this position would have become untenable in time, though curiously it was reaffirmed in 1794, Grose, J. even saying that in his opinion "it is a wise rule."27 In 1812 the case of Pickering v. Busk28 had indicated that the "apparent authority" doctrine might well come to be widely enough expanded to reverse the Paterson case. So, why wait? especially as it was still "necessary to trade" that the factor be encouraged to make advances to his principal. The Factors Act simply closed one eye to the point that money raised on one man's goods might reach quite a different shipper-or reach none at all. The other eye, possibly, was already on the "needs" of the commercial banker. At all events, it was this English law, in the broad sense, which set the pattern for the growing commerce of the colonists at the close of the 18th century. The factor's lien seems to have been accepted more or less as a matter of course by Kent, C. J. in 1809, when he extended it to cover ship and cargo in the hands of the factors' New York agent on the return voyage.29 Previously, in 1804, Judge Bushrod Washington of the newly organized Federal judiciary had even gone so far as to permit a factor, who had waived his lien, to retain the proceeds of certain tobacco shipments and "offset" them on obligations of the shipper planters.30 But this is perhaps best understood as Federalist3l law. The development did not stop with recognition of the selling factor's lien, however, for in a series of cases beginning with the Massachusetts decision of Stevens v. Robins32 in 1815, the buying factor likewise was given not only a specific but a general lien on goods purchased for his principal. The prevailing Federalist politics of the time was not averse to any argument having as its object the promotion of trade.
The factor's lien being thus established, the question to be see-sawed back and forth across the next hundred years had to do with determining the point of time at which it first attached. According to Chambre, J., factors should be encouraged not only to make loans against goods in possession but against those "which must come into their hands as 27 And in 1817, in Nichols v. Clent,37 a case involving a shipment of flour being sent to Bristol by trow, the factor again lost, although on receipt of the miller's letter of advice he had accepted bills against the consignment. Granted that the factors were correctly dealt with in Kinlock v. Craig, this was a case "a multo fortiori," for "how could the letters give them an equitable right to the goods in the trow."38 Evidently the factor was not to be greatly encouraged to make advances on domestic transactions, unless he got actual possession; bills of lading were not widely used. The infant textile industry provided the setting for the first cases on the point in this country. In 1834 a Providence thread maker delivered 10 boxes of cotton thread to a wagoner to take to Boston and leave at the City tavern where he was accustomed to put up. The thread arrived in the evening and was attached by creditors of the shipper, the sheriff storing it temporarily in the harness room. But it appeared that the manufacturer had reached Boston in the morning of the same day and procured an advance from the factor with whom he usually traded against an invoice of the shipment. No bill of lading was involved, but the waybill showed simply that the goods were to be left at the tavern. On this state of facts, Shaw, C. J., was clear that nothing had happened to change the "legal possession" of the manufacturer and the factor accordingly lost.39 Delivery to the carrier was not delivery to the factor, since delivery was not made pursuant to a previous agreement.
The needs of the textile business were made very much more apparent to the New York court in 1840 and 1841 when Holbrook v. Wight40 and Grosvenor v. Phillips4' were decided by Cowen, J. In the first case, 14 boxes of "sattinets" had been sent by the mill in Middlebury, Vt., to forwarding agents in Troy marked with the factor's name. In the second, brown cloth, manufactured in Auburn, New York, had been delivered to the Auburn & Syracuse Rail-Road Company for transshipment at Syracuse by canal to New York. In both cases invoices were sent promptly to the factor, describing the goods in detail, but no bill of lading appears to have been used in either case. And while advances made in the Holbrook case appear to have been more or less closely allocated to the shipments, the factor was already in advance to the mill in the Grosvenor case and made no specific advance on the goods in question. What should be done? In the first case the jury came to the factor's rescue with a finding that the shipping agent intended to hold for the consignee, but in the Grosvenor case it was decided as matter of law, that, in this situation, the factor's claim was superior to that of execution creditors.
How rationalize such a result? Obviously it could not be said to depend upon lien, for here certainly was no actual possession and, at best, but a shadowy constructive possession in the factor. He was, it was argued, but "a mere commission dealer," entitled to no more consideration than any other unsecured creditor. Forced to abandon the "lien" rationale the court resorted to a more potent one,-the factor had acquired "a vested interest"42 in the goods. There was precedent, moreover, for Evre, J., had said in Haille v. Smith: "From the moment the goods were set apart for this particular purpose, why should we not hold the property in them to have been changed, it being in perfect conformity to the agreement, and such an execution thereof as the justice of the case requires ?"43 That the factor in the Grosvenor case ' had received no bill of lading was a minor matter, for "there is no magic in such a document, especially as between the original parties."" At all events here was "law" enough to suit the factor's needs for the time. And, although some courts had trouble in seeing how the factor could have "property,"-inasmuch as the consignor obviously had the "risk"45 still the result was widely approved.46 Nor, as might be expected, was it the textile factor alone who benefitted. In 1850, Taney, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court, was even more explicit in guarding the New York factor's rights to some 350 barrels of mess port which had been attached while in warehouse at Fort Wayne, Indiana, awaiting the opening of transportation in the spring. "To the extent of his advances he is a purchaser, and the legal title was conveyed to him to protect his advances."47 Why this apparent solicitude for the factor? Because, the transaction represented "the usual course of the great inland commerce by which the larger part of the agriculture productions of the valley of the Mississippi find their way to market" and a decision adverse to the factor "would certainly be not less injurious to the agriculturist and producer than to the merchant and trader."48 The west, too, needed money.
It is a fair hunch that much the same thought operated also to vest the buying factor with the "property" in goods purchased for his principal; but the record is not so clear. At all events, in the great case of Farmers and Merchants' National Bank v. Logan,49 decided in 1878 by the New York court, the result depended on finding "property"-a lien no longer would suffice-in Sears and Daw, the "commission merchants" who had acted for their New York principal in buying a canal boat load of wheat at Buffalo. Although Folger, J., conceded that the principal had the profit and loss risk, still he found with a perfectly straight face that Sears and Daw had the "property."50 It followed, moreover, that the plaintiff bank likewise got the factor's property on taking the bill of lading, for certainly such was the intent of the parties. The next step was a longer one, but it was taken in stride, the "property," moreover, was not lost by giving over the goods into the custody of the principal-buyer on a limited authority. So was born the trustreceipt, which is a different story, but the idea of a split property concept has since become quite orthodox in sales law.51
But the Farmers Bank case was also evidence that factoring had two distinct sides: one financing, the other merchandising; and that, moreover, with improved transportation and a developing railroad bill of lading,52 the banker was prepared to take an increasing share in the former. Of course, the early case of Haille v. Smith, in which the banker had made advances under an arrangement whereby goods would be shipped to his factor-affiliate for sale-and as security-had shown that these functions might easily be separated. Whether it was to meet the banker threat, or because some factors rather fancied themselves in the role of banker, is not clear, but it is well established that by the close of the century a good deal had been happening in the business of the textile factor. Some had come to concern themselves principally with accounts, while others had gravitated to the selling side; thus making two "lillies,"1 so to speak, to grow where but one had grown before.
The It is difficult to recreate at this date the atmosphere in which this case was decided, or to determine exactly what furnished the emotional bent of the court in refusing to accord Schefer a security position, as it did.54 The situation was new to the court. One gathers that Holt, J., did not see how Schefer could be called a "factor" at all, since he did not sell.55 Nor, was the word "consigned" on the statement sufficient to constitute a consignment, for a "man cannot consign a thing to another by merely saying that he consigns it, any more than he can deliver it by mere words."56 Thus, not content with doubting that Schefer was a factor, the court was further of the opinion that he had not obtained that possession of the goods requisite to a lien. As for the receivables, the ancient Mansfield lien upon the "price"57 went out with the lien ' The court mentions at the outset that if Schefer's claim were sustained in full there would be no funds available to pay general creditors-or presumably the costs of administration. Id., at 317. There is, of course, no suggestion that this may have influenced the decision. upon the goods and, there being no express assignment, no other basis for a claim upon them was left. Apparently "promotion of trade" was no longer the overweening purpose of the court.
It would have been relatively easy for the court-had it been so minded-to have ruled in the words of Taney, C. J., that the factor had obtained a "title" to the goods. As for the point that the purported "consignment" was no "delivery," it is, of course, a commonplace of sales law that delivery of specific goods is not essential to the buyer's title.58 But Holt, J., did not see how this position could be reconciled with the holdings that the consignor has a preferred claim to goods in his factor's hands-over and above the factor's lien interest-upon the factor's insolvency.59 Moreover, counsel appear to have been of two minds, for they evidently insisted most strenuously on the inconsistent possessory lien position, relying upon their device of an assigned lease to carry the day. But as to this it was enough for the court to say: "A court of equity looks through the form to the substance."00 Evidently the notion that "equality is equity," which Lord Hardwick had so long ago subordinated in favor of the factor's lien, was once more to have sway.
The case of Ommen v. Talcottll which grew out of a similar bankruptcy in 1902 was even more positive in condemning the "assigned lease" as a means of obtaining "possession." And this, in spite of the fact that an employee of Talcott, the alleged factor, had gone through the ceremony of demanding the keys to the premises and then of handing them back again to be held for the lessee. In addition, at the trial, "four" eminent merchants were again produced, according to the best tradition, this time to explain to the court that the word "Annex" after the factor's name at the entrance told all and sundry that the goods stored on the premises belonged to the factor-but for once the court was not impressed. That is, not favorably, for in the view of Holt, J.,62 this was all merely one more of "the innumerable schemes by which merchants have attempted to create liens on their goods" with "the idea of giving notice enough to satisfy the law and not enough to inform the creditors."S63 In fact it did not even satisfy the law, nor did the court see any reason to "be astute to discover some equitable lien which the parties did not undertake to create."64 It was not until 1920, in Boise v. Talcott,65 after various attempts to perfect a common law pledge had failed,66 that a cumbersome possession by the factor did satisfy the court.
The Omtmen case, however, was useful to the factor on one point; it at least recognized that under some circumstances an "assignment" of accounts receivable would stand up in a bankruptcy proceeding. That is, the court held that, under the contract before it, those accounts where advances had been made upon goods about to be sold should pass to the factor, the assignment being complete when the purchaser received notice by the invoice. There was no consideration of whether an assignment of future book accounts would be valid or not.67 And, of course, there was no suggestion that the factor would have a general lien on any assigned account.68 Some progress had been made, however, toward repairing the wreckage left by the Ryttenberg case.
Several So much for banker, merchant and manufacturer,-but the little fellow, unversed in the wiles of the mercantile world, is perhaps still entitled to consideration. Of course, even he may not be so naive as to believe everything he sees; there must be someone to make mistakes so that others may prosper according to their deserts. Laying gross deception to one side-that is "fraud"-which has been frowned upon ever since Twynes case8' at least, a moderate amount of sharp dealing, has always been part and parcel of a competitive system.82 But in the sales field at least the rewards for sharp corner cutting per se have been decreasing-as witness the decline in recent years of that good old doctrine for the promotion of trade, caveat em ptor.83 No doubt Lord Hardwick had the long range interests of trade in mind when he said it would be better "to allow the public notorious transaction than that which is secret."84 For, even the larger fellows-or their financial agencies-must be given some means of learning facts; criminal prosecutions85 for false statements are often too much like locking the barn after the horse is stolen. The compromise hammered out in this fashion by the legislature was a good one. The notice requirements were neither unduly cumbersome-Dean Stone to the contrary notwithstanding86 -nor did they fail to give at least a hint of the borrower's actual state of affairs, that is, at least to the larger creditor. It is apparent, moreover, that Taney, C. J., was not so far out of line last century, in finding a "property" interest in the factor who had made advances.87 A re-reading of the cases so deciding discloses that always the goods were in the hands of a third person-carrier, warehouseman or processor-and never in those of the borrower.88 And, in spite of the needless occupation with the question whether "the law" dubbed the bailee agent for the lender or agent for the buyer, the needs of trade usually furnished the answer. 305, 313 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919) to do business when, to any considerable extent, your rights depend on questions of more or less."10
The plot was obviously become too thick for comfort. In 1931, therefore, the legislature again was called upon for assistance and the act of 1911 was amended. The old provision had read that "liens upon merchandise or the proceeds thereof" shall not be void by reason of want of possession, that is, upon filing the notice and posting the sign provided for. But some courts had begun to doubt whether the new factor was really a factor at all, hinting rather openly that he was really a banker,"11 a wolf in sheep's clothing so to speak. The thought occurred, what if some literal-minded court should next decide, since the lender was not really a factor at all, that the basis for his lien had disappeared? To prevent any such woeful miscarriage of justice, "factor" was therefore defined as any consignee or pledgee who advances money on goods consigned or pledged to him, whether or not he is employed to sell them."2 And it was then provided, affirmatively, that such a factor has "a continuing general lien" upon all goods consigned to himwhether or not in his possession-on any accounts receivable or other proceeds resulting from a disposal of the goods. That is, where he has an agreement to such effect.
Surely the factor had now earned a "breathing spell," not that he appears ever to have let his legal pitfalls interfere particularly with his business. At all events, with the insolvency of Nathan & Cohen, Inc.,"13 a concern operating in the cotton converting business, his legal hopes were largely justified. Swan, J. had no difficulty in holding that goods in the bankrupt's hands were subject to the factor's lien under which is typical of a contrary line of authority. "In case of a receivership for an insolvent corporation, procured at the instance of general creditors on the ground of insolvency, we are unable to perceive why a secret lien unenforceable at law should not be defeated by the seizure of the property 'by the hand of the court' as effectually as by the making of an attachment or levying an execution by a sheriff." 110 "I desire nothing so much, as that all questions of mercantile law should be fully settled and ascertained; and it is of much more consequence that they should be so, than which way the decision is" per Mansfield Section 45, the necessary sign having been posted and notice filed.1"4 Goods at the dyers, as well as finished goods which the factor had consigned to an agent for sale, were both held to be subject to the ancient common law lien, there being no possession in the borrower in such case "giving him a false credit."1"5 Even the Goldstein v. Rusch"I6 case was approved, by way of dicta, for there "the returned goods stood in the place of the validly assigned account, hence no preference.
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It was only the goods purchased after known bankruptcy, and on which no new advance had been made, that were denied to the factor, but that, at least, was a result, more or less to be expected." 18 Evidently his purposes. But it is equally clear that in the last quarter century there has been doubt; the old confident singleness of purpose, the further "promotion of trade," has been lacking at times. Or possibly the doubt has been whether the present factor contributes substantially to that end. Though he appears to show a profit, there has been a feeling that profit, like virtue, is its own reward-and that the courts need no longer be unduly solicitous of his affairs.
It is not possible in the remaining pages even to attempt to whitewash the new factor's economic life; besides, if that is desirable, it can be much better done by an economist.'32 It is evident, however, that he has been retiring to an ever safer position; no longer is he at the outposts selling the nation's goods. Where once the textile factor had a little office in the corner of a warehouse stacked with merchandise he now occupies whole floors with no goods in sight.'33 But even in the beginning selling was not the factor's sole, or necessarily his most important, function. The lien was given according to Chambre, J. "to encourage factors to advance money, "134 not primarily to sell goods. Or, one might say equally, to encourage the factor to guarantee the purchaser's account, for the del credere factor seems always to have had a lien on goods and the resulting receivable.135 Both these services the modern "factor" performs. In addition, for his own protection and incidentally for that of his client, he supplies a highly skilled credit service.'36 And, encouraged therein by Benedict v. Ratner, he has further kept a close hand on collections, another important service to his client. 137 Whether a concern doing such things is properly called a factor is of course now beside the point. It is evident that as his interest has come to center in the receivable-rather than in the merchandise-his service approaches more closely that of the banker's. But when it has been suggested, once or twice, that he is in fact a banker-and should be regulated138 or taxed139 as such-there has been serious objection. For this purpose, at least, the "factor does something more than merely loan money."140 And, conversely, it has been pointed out that banks never make advances on goods or the receivables resulting from their sale and that they do not guarantee accounts nor do they have any facilities for storing goods.'4' Of course to anyone acquainted with present day banking this is essentially incorrect, as is the suggestion that the modern factor is primarily concerned with goods.
But it is true that the banker way of doing these things is different. He has different machinery and, it may be said, a different psychology.'42 He does not advertise Sales for Sale,'43 but on the contrary, the lowly borrower must approach him hat in hand, that is until recently. But he positively does make loans against goods, whether in storage or transit, if they are represented by a negotiable document. He positively buys or makes advances on receivables144 -but they must be in negotiable form. Indeed, in many cases now, he makes advances against the same type of receivables as does the factor. And, while his efforts to guarantee accounts long were obstructed by the ultra zires doctrine,'45 he now does the same thing by issuing a letter of credit undertaking himself to accept and pay the seller's draft. The circumstance that it is the buyer in the letter of credit transaction who arranges for the credit, while it is the seller who initiates things in the factor set-up, would seem to be of no especial functional significance.'46 It is the sale that is being financed in either event. These and other differences in form, however, may save the factor from regulation yet awhile as a banker.147 On the other hand, the underlying similarity in function should possibly entitle the factor to a share in the favor which the banker has enjoyed through the years.
Possibly it is the finance company, the factor's neighbor on the left, which has caused the courts at times to look askance at the factor. In terms of fees, however, the line between the two is very marked.
The cost of money borrowed from the wholesale148 "finance" or "discount" company averages from 15 to 20%.149 The factor on the other hand charges a fee of about 2% and interest at the rate of 6% for advances actually made.150 The difference is due to differences in the way the two businesses are run. In the first place much of the finance company business is done on a non-notification151 basis, forced in part by the adverse business and banking attitude toward anyone who has to "hock his accounts."'152 The result is that, not only may a company not infrequently have to contest its title to the account,153 but it is f orever being faced with loss due to the Benedict v. Ratner situation.154 But probably the real, though less tangible difference, lies in the fact that the factor has grown up out of a merchandise background-he still knows something first hand of styling, of budgeting production, of credit conditions and such matters-while the finance company, and to a lesser extent the banker,155 has been concerned almost exclusively with the receivable. thereto in event of a merchandise dispute.163 Only the banker in the commercial credit transaction assumes a greater obligation to the seller, since the agreement there is to pay against documents whether the goods conform or not. 164 More than all else, it would seem, the factor owes his existence today to the stubborn persistence of the open book account way of doing business. The banker's trade acceptance, though widely publicizedand even, by rediscount by the Federal Reserve Banks, made directly convertible into money-does not afford the buyer an opportunity to assert defenses, or sufficient leeway to "jockey" and "chisel." So a fortiori with the banker's letter of credit machinery. But with equal certainty here were assets of enormous value which, to use the words of Buller, J., in speaking of goods covered by an ocean bill of lading, could not remain "locked up" forever.165 Being highly liquid there was a place for them in the market. An economical use of capital demanded that they be brought to market. If a large strata of business would not conform to the banker way of life, the obvious thing to do was to shape financial machinery to fit the business view. The amazing thing is not that the factor is now doing this but that the development has been so long delayed, and painful.
Taking a larger view of the matter this transition in the factor's business is but an eddy in the broad movement, at least two centuries old,166 looking toward an ever increasing liquidity.167 A vast increase in incorporation, negotiability accorded to the share certificate and to the various commodity documents, the greater standardization of goods, all developments of the last quarter century, have greatly accelerated the movement. As to why we are mobilizing an ever increasing amount of property in liquid form has not been determined, or particularly questioned. At the same time, that "an economic structure based on liquidity must almost of necessity be fragile," to quote from Berle's brilliant essay on the subject,'68 cannot well be gainsaid, any more than that the device can "prove useful." Whether the new development in the factor's business is socially desirable or not is thus too broad a question to answer; but that he builds in a long tradition is evident enough. 
